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This paper offers a critical appraisal of the various methods used to date to investigate inequity 
in the delivery of health care. It concludes that none of the methods used to date is particularly 
well equipped to provide unbiassed estimates of the extent of inequity. It also concludes that Le 
Grand’s (1978) approach is likely to point towards inequity favouring the rich even when none 
exists. The paper offers an alternative approach, which builds on the approaches to date but 
seeks to overcome their deficiencies. 
1. Introduction 
Much of the empirical work on equity in the delivery of health care has 
been directed at the issue of horizontal equity.’ Typically this is interpreted 
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‘The issue of vertical equity in the delivery of health care - i.e. the issue of how those in 
unequal need should be treated - rarely gets discussed in the health economics literature. Cullis 
and West (1979, pp. 237-239) is a rare exception. Hurst (1985) claims to address the issue of 
vertical equity, but uses the definition of equity proposed by Aday et al. (1980). namely that 
equity requires that illness be the major determinant of the allocation of resources. This 
definition is really a definition of horizontal rather than vertical equity (cf. fn. 6). 
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to mean that persons in equal need of medical care should receive the same 
treatment, irrespective of whether they happen to be poor or rich, old or 
young, black or white, and so on. ’ Policy statements attach particular 
importance to the notion that violations of the horizontal equity principle 
should not be systematically related to differences in ability to pay. Thus if 
there are two persons in equal need of medical care, it would be considered 
undesirable if the richer of the tqo were to receive better treatment. 
Establishing the extent of such income-related inequity is thus accepted as one 
of the principal objectives of empirical research in the area. 
Whilst there is broad agreement over research objectives in the field, there 
is less consensus over methodology. Empirical findings have therefore been 
the subject of some controversy. Many of these have been based on the 
approach proposed by Le Grand (1978) [cf. Hurst (1985), O’Donnell and 
Propper (1991), Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Paci ( 1989)].3 This approach 
has, however, been criticized by various authors, notably Collins and Klein 
(1980) and Puffer (1986), who have also offered alternative approaches. 
Though counter-attacks have been launched [cf. Le Grand (1981), Wagstaff 
(1989a)], these have focussed on the empirical findings of the studies to date 
rather than on methodological issues. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to appraise the various methodol- 
ogies that have been proposed to date. We suggest hat none is particularly 
well equipped to measure income-related inequity in the delivery of health 
care and that most of the results reported to date should be interpreted with 
caution. We go on to suggest a new approach, which builds on previous 
approaches. This is then illustrated using microdata from Italy and the 
Netherlands. 
2. Previous approaches to the analysis of inequity 
Studies of horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care have typically 
been based on either inter-group comparisons [cf. Le Grand (1978), Collins 
and Klein (1980)] or regression analysis [cf. Puffer (1986)]. This section 
critically appraises these approaches. 
2.1. Le Grand’s approach 
Le Grand (1978), in his analysis of the equity of the delivery of health care 
20ther interpretations of equity in the delivery of health care do exist. The other most 
common definitions are equality of access and equality of health [see, e.g., Le Grand (1982) 
Mooney (1983, 1986)J. The former has been the subject of very little empirical work, though the 
latter has been the subject of several empirical studies [see, e.g., DHSS (1980). Wilkinson (1986)]. 
Mooney and McGuire (1987) have argued, however, that, at least in the case of Britain, policy 
objectives in the field of equity seem to be defined not in terms of equality of health, but rather 
in terms of equal treatment for equal need and equality of access. 
%‘Donnell and Propper do not rely exclusively on Le Grand’s approach. 
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Fig. I. Le Grand’s (1978) results, England and Wales, 1972 
in the British National Health Service (NHS), performed two types of 
calculation. In the first he computed the cost to the NHS per person 
reporting illness in each socio-economic group (SEG). This is obtained by 
dividing each group’s total imputed expenditure by the number of persons 
reporting either chronic or acute illness in the group. Le Grand’s expenditure 
figures for each SEG are shown by the four lightly shaded bars in fig. 1. The 
results indicate that the top two SEGs combined receive 40% *more 
expenditure per person ill than the bottom two SEGs combined. In the 
second calculation Le Grand computed the share of expenditure received by 
each SEG and compared this with the group’s share of ill-health. His results 
- shown by the bold and striped bars in fig. 1 - indicate that the top two 
SEGs combined receive 16.8% of NHS expenditure but contain only 13.9% 
of persons reporting ill, while the bottom two SEGs combined receive 27.3% 
of NHS expenditure but contain as much as 31.9% of persons reporting ill. 
Le Grand concluded from both findings that the NHS has failed to 
achieve equal treatment for equal need [Le Grand (1982, p. 46)]. The 
argument is not spelt out, but seems to run something like this [cf. Wagstaff 
et al. (1989, p. 99)]. Assume that all persons reporting ill are in equal need 
and that only persons who are ill receive health care. Then if horizontal 
equity is achieved, so that those in equal need receive the same amount of 
public expenditure, expenditure per person reporting ill will be the same in 
all SEGs- and the 
proportional to its 
reporting ill is less 
share of NI-IS expenditure going to each SEG will be 
share of persons reporting ill. If expenditure per person 
for the lower SEGs than for the higher SEGs, or if the 
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share of NHS expenditure received by the lower SEGs is less than their share 
of persons reporting ill, it must be concluded that the sick in the lower SEGs 
receive less NHS expenditure than the sick in the higher SEGs. Equals are 
not being treated equally and this horizontal inequity apparently favours the 
rich. 
2.2. Criticisms of Le Grand’s approach 
2.2. I. Measurement of inequity 
In his attempt to give some indication of the extent of inequity Le Grand 
relies on comparisons between the bottom and top SEGs. Like all range 
measures of inequality, this approach suffers from two well-known shortcom- 
ings: it focuses exclusively on the extreme classes and fails to take into 
account their relative sizes. 
2.2.2. The proportionality assumption 
As indicated above, one of the assumptions implicit in Le Grand’s analysis 
is that only persons who are ill receive treatment. Collins and Klein (1980) 
have questioned this. They argue that, by failing to take into account that 
the non-sick may also be consumers of health care, Le Grand fails to 
recognize that the sick and those receiving health care may not be identical 
populations. According to Collins and Klein, therefore, Le Grand runs the 
risk of committing the ecological fallacy.4 
It turns out that precise predictions about the direction of bias can be 
made by using some simple algebra. Suppose we divide the population into 
two groups, rich and poor. Now consider the following model of health care 
consumption in which (expected) medical care consumption is proportional 
to health: 
i E rich, 
i E poor, 
where mi is medical care consumption, hi is a dummy variable taking a value 
of one if individual i reports illness, 8, and /I, are parameters, and u,~ and uPi 
are error terms. In what follows it is assumed that E[u,~] = ECuPi] = 0. The /I’s 
are expected to be positive, i.e. individuals are expected to receive more 
medical care if they are ill than if they are well. 
For this simple model, the means of the two groups’ medical care 
utilization are given by 
4Collins and Klein argue that their empirical results support this argument. For dissenting 
views see Le Grand (1981) and Wagstaff (1989a). For a discussion of the ecological fallacy in the 
context of the demand for health care, see van Vliet and van Doorslaer (1988). 
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where m, is mean medical care consumption amongst the rich, h, is mean 
health status of the rich, m,, is mean medical care consumption amongst the 
poor and h, is mean health status of the poor. Subtracting mp from m,, and 
then adding and subtracting &hi,, we get 
4 - mp = PA - B,h, = A@, - hp) + ~,(B, -BP). 
(W (Cl 
Thus mean medical care consumption can differ between rich and poor for 
two reasons. First, the rich and poor do not enjoy the same health status 
and therefore have different needs for medical care [the (B) term]: one would 
expect the poor to be, on average, in worse health than the rich and 
therefore h,<h,. Second, the slope coefficients differ [the (C) term]. The 
assumption implicit in Le Grand’s approach is that the first term (B) does 
not reflect income-related inequity, or, if it does, such inequity is history. This 
is not true of the (C) term, which will be non-zero if persons in one group 
currently receive more medical care when sick than persons in the other 
group. In this case persons in equal need end up receiving different amounts 
of health care. For example, if the rich receive more medical care when ill 
than the poor, we have /Ir>p, and therefore (C) >O. In general, income- 
related inequity can be said to exist in this simple model if the slope 
coefficients differ and therefore (C) is non-zero. 
It is worth noting that the definition of inequity being proposed here is 
similar to the traditional definition of discrimination in labour economics. 
There discrimination is said to occur when equally productive workers 
receive different levels of pay [cf., e.g., Sloane (1985, p. 85)]. Discrimination 
in the labour market can be on the basis of gender, race or marital status, so 
that in empirical work one might want to estimate the extent of, say, sex 
discrimination. The analysis of discrimination tends to proceed along the 
lines above. The sample is split according to, say, gender. Evidence of 
discrimination is then sought in differences in earnings functions. We return 
to the discrimination literature in section 2.3.4. 
The presence of the (B) term above suggests that if one is trying to assess 
the extent of inequity by performing inter-group comparisons, one must find 
a way of parcelling out the inter-group differences in medical care consump- 
tion that are due to inter-group differences in health status. It thus makes 
little sense simply to look for differences in mean medical care expenditures 
between income groups. Instead one would have to adjust for differences in 
health status. 
This is, of course, the idea behind Le Grand’s two methods outlined above. 
174 A. Wagstaff et al., Measurement of horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care 
Unfortunately, it turns out that neither is very satisfactory. For reasons of 
space we consider hereafter only the second. Similar results can be obtained 
for the first [see Wagstaff (1989b)]. For the simple model in eqs. (1) the 
expenditure received by the rich group is equal to 
where r is the number of rich persons. Likewise the expenditure received by 
the poor group is equal to p’ flphpr where p is the number of poor persons. 
The share of total medical care expenditure going to the rich - denoted by 
S,, - is given by 
s,,= r-m, r Ah 
r.m,+p.m,=r.B,h,+p.P,h,’ 
The total number of rich persons reporting illness is equal to xi E rich hi = r. h,. 
The comparable figure for the poor is p. h,. The rich group’s share of 
ill-health is therefore given by 
Shr= 
r-h, 
r.h,+p.h,’ 
If there is no income-related inequity so that /I,= /IP= p, the rich group’s 
share of medical care expenditures becomes 
I%- M 
Smr=~(r.h,+p.h,)=S,,. 
Thus if the rich group’s share of medical expenditure exceeds its share of 
ill-health, the implication is that fir>&. 
The above implicitly assumes, however, that only persons reporting illness 
receive medical care, or equivalently (expected) medical care consumption is 
proportional to health, i.e. E[m, 1 hi=01 =O. If this is not the case, intercepts 
need to be included in the medical care equations, so that E[mi 1 hi=01 is 
non-zero. In other words, one needs to recognize that under the prevailing 
health care delivery system the relationship between medical care and need 
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may not be proportional.’ Thus suppose that the true model is linear but 
not proportional,6 
m,= %+Brhi+4i, 
I 
i E rich, 
I aP + pphi + uPi, i E poor. (2) 
The means of the two groups’ medical care utilization are now given by 
4 = a, + IV,, mp = clP + &hp. 
Subtracting mP from m,, and then adding and subtracting &hp, we get 
4 - mp = a, - aP + B,k - BP& = (a, -up) + P,(h, - hp) + h,(B, - B,). (3) 
(4 (B) (C) 
There is thus an additional source of difference between the two groups’ 
means, namely that the intercepts of the medical care equations differ [the 
(A) term]. This also reflects income-related inequity, since even if the two 
groups are, on average, in equal need of medical care [i.e. (B) is zero] and 
the slope coeflicients are identical [i.e. (C) is zero], persons in one group will, 
on average, receive more medical care than persons in the other. This second 
source of inequity ought to be reflected in any estimate of the extent of 
income-related inequity. 
Suppose, then, that the true model is model (2). Le Grand’s approach 
turns out to be biassed towards the detection of inequity favouring the rich. 
In particular we have the following result. 
Proposition 1. Assume that the true model underlying the delivery of health 
care is as in eq. (2) and that h,> h,. Then it follows that Smr> Shr, ecen when 
the health care system is equitable. 
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that &=&,=/I and that 
a,=ap =a. On the definition above, therefore, there is no inequity [i.e. 
(A)+(C) in eq. (3) is zero]. In this case the share of medical care exenditure 
going to the rich is 
‘Puffer (1986) makes essentially the same point, but appears to confuse horizontal and vertical 
equity. He suggests that Le Grand’s approach ‘implicitly assum that a fair distribution of 
health care is one that is directly proportional to the measure of health status’ [Puffer (1936, p. 
296)]. Given that Le Grand’s analysis relates to horizontal inequity, the question of whether or 
not health care ought to be distributed in proportion to need, or equivalently whether the non- 
sick ought to receive medical care as well as the sick, is irrelevant. This is a question of vertical 
rather than horizontal equity. What does matter is whether by incorrectly assuming that the 
non-sick do not receive medical care one runs the risk of incorrectly concluding that horizontal 
inequity exists. 
60ne could of course also explore the implications of non-Iinearities, though we do not do so 
in this paper. 
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snr = a*r+/J(r*h,) 
cr(r+p)+&h,+p.h,)’ 
Suppose that this is less than Shr. Then we have 
r(a + &A r-h, 
ol(r+p)+B(r.h,+p.h,)<t.h,+p.h, 
which contradicts the presumption that the poor tend to be more likely to 
report illness than the rich. 
Thus we conclude that in the case where the sick and non-sick are 
consumers of health care, Le Grand’s approach is biassed towards the 
detection of inequity favouring the rich. In other words, they would suggest 
the existence of inequity favouring the rich even when the system is equitable.’ 
2.2.3. Chronic versus acute conditions 
The second assumption implicit in Le Grand’s approach is that all persons 
reporting illness are to be regarded as being in equal need of health care. 
Puffer (1986) has argued that this assumption cannot bre justified if, as in Le 
Grand’s analysis, a person is classified as ill if he reports chronic or acute 
illness. 
The implications of this assumption not holding can be seen as follows. 
Let ci be a dummy variable taking a value of one if individual i reports 
chronic health problems and Si a dummy taking a value of one if individual i 
reports acute sickness. Suppose the true mode1 is now 
Mi= I a, + BlCi +?,Si + Urip iErich, ap + fi,Ci + TpSi + Upi, i 6 poor, (4) 
where we expect the B’s and the T’S to be positive. The difference between the 
two income groups’ mean medical care consumption can now be decom- 
posed as 
m,-m,=(a,--C(p)+BI(c,--Cp)+cp(Br-Bp)+~,(~,~~p)+~p(5,-~p). (5) 
(A) (W (Cl 0% 02 
‘Cf. O’Donnell and Propper (1990) on this point. 
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The (B) and (D) terms here reflect the fact that the two groups have different 
degrees of ill-health. The other three terms reflect income-related inequity. 
For this model we have the following result. 
Proposition 2. Assume the model underlying the delivery of health care is as 
in eq. (4). Then it follows that in general S,,#S,,, even when the health care 
system is equitable. 
Proof. The share of medical care going to the rich is given by 
The total number of rich persons reporting either chronic or acute sickness is 
equal to Cisrich ci + CipriCh Si less the number reporting both chronic and acute 
sickness. If one ignores this latter group, the rich group’s share of ill-health is 
rk + 4 
=p(c,+s,)+r(c,+s,)’ 
Suppose there is no income-related inequity, so that a,=ap=a, 8, =Bp=p 
and T, = TV = T. Then 
&I, = r(a + PC, + 5%) 
P(a + PC, + TSJ + r(a + PC, + TS~)' 
which will in general differ from S,,. 
A suficient condition for S,,= S,, is that a =0 and /I =T.* The latter 
condition amounts to saying that acute and chronic sickness currently 
receive equal amounts of expenditure - a condition which seems unlikely to 
be satisfied. Whether, in this case, Le Grand’s approach is biassed in favour 
of or against the detection of inequity cannot be said a priori. What can be 
said is the following. 
Proposition 3. Assume that the true model underlying the delivery of health 
care is as in eq. (4). Then it follows that if sJs, is less (greater) than c,/cp, S,, 
will exceed (fall short of) S,, even if the health care system is equitable. 
‘Note that if one follows Le Grand’s and defines the denominator as the total number 
reporting either chronic illness or acute sickness (i.e. with the intersection eliminated), the 
expenditure per person ill varies across groups when the system is equitable even when z=O and 
/?=5. 
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Proof. Take the case where S,, > S,,. Then 
4a + PC, + TS,) r(cr + 4 
P(a + PC, + TSJ + r(a + PC, + 4 ’ p(c, + sJ + T(c, + s,) 
* (a + PC,+ TS,) CP(c, + SJ + r(c, + s,)l 
> (c, + s,) [pta + /3c, + zsJ + r(a + PC, + rs,)] 
* aC(c, - 4 + (sp - s,)l + (5 - Pkc, - spc,) > 0. 
One can safely assume that c,> c, and sP>sr, i.e. that the poor are more 
likely to report chronic and acute sickness than the rich. Thus the term in 
square brackets on the left-hand side of the inequality above is positive. One 
can also probably assume that r<P, i.e. that the chronically sick tend to 
receive more resources than the acutely sick. Thus 
&II, > SIX * s&l-spc,<o - s,/sp<c,/cp. 
The opposite follows in the case where S,, < Shr. 
2.2.4. The confounding effects of demographic factors 
Le Grand (1978, 1982) has suggested another reason for being wary about 
accepting his results at face value, namely that they fail to take into account 
the potentially confounding influences of demographic factors. He suggests 
that his results ‘may derive simply from differences in the age and sex 
composition of the groups’ [Le Grand (1982, p. 26)]. Because of this he 
presents age-sex standardized results alongside his unstandardized results. 
The rationale for standardization can be clarified as follows. Suppose that 
the amount of medical care a person receives depends not only on his 
income and health status, but also on his age.g Thus let Xi be a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if the person in question is elderly and zero 
otherwise. The model (2) becomes 
ar+IPhi+~rxi+ucv i E rich, 
ap + Bphi + 6,xi + upi, i E poor. (6) 
‘That receipt of medical care depends not only on health status but also on the x variable 
might in itself be viewed as inequitable [cf. Anderson (1976). Aday et al. (1980)]. The founding 
fathers of the British NHS, for example, spoke of the importance of ensuring that receipt of 
medical care should not depend on factors irrelevant to real need, such as age, sex, place of 
residence and occupation. However, this involves inequity that is related to factors other than 
income. Because here we focus on income-related inequity, our interest lies in the implications of 
a non-zero 6 coefficient for measuring income-related inequity. 
The 
tion 
The 
that 
A. Wagstaff et al., Measurement of horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care 179 
difference between the two income groups’ mean medical care consump- 
can now be decomposed as 
m, -mP = (a, - aP) + B,(h, - hp) + h&B, - 8,) + 6,(x, - xP) + xr(& - 6,). 
(4 (B) ((2 (D) (E) 
(7) 
fifth term (E) reflects a further source of income-related inequity, namely 
the elderly get treated differently depending on whether they are rich or 
poor. The fourth term (D) simply reflects the fact that the two income groups 
differ not only in their health status, but also in their mean ages. This has 
nothing to do with income-related inequity. The presence of the (D) term 
suggests that in order to be able to detect income-related inequity with any 
accuracy one must take into account not only inter-group differences in 
health status, but also inter-group differences in demographic characteristics, 
such as age. Failure to do this might result in one drawing incorrect 
inferences regarding the extent of income-related inequity. 
In fact it turns out that when the 6’s in eq. (6) are non-zero, Le Grand’s 
approach gives the wrong answer even if there are no differences in the age 
and sex composition of the two income groups. 
Proposition 4. Assume that the true model underlying the delivery of health 
care is as in eqs. (6) except that only the sick receive treatment. Then it follows 
that when the health care system is equitable S,, differs from S,, even if the age 
and sex composition of the income groups are the same. 
Proof. With ar=aP=O, &=&,=/I and 6,=6,=6 the share of medical care 
expenditure going to the rich is 
Suppose now that the two income groups have the same age structure, so 
that x,=x,=x. Then we have 
which differs from Sbr, the rich group’s share of ill-health. 
A sufficient condition for Le Grand’s approach to give the correct answer 
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is that x,/xp=h,/hp. This latter condition wou!d be met if (but not only if) 
the two groups had the same mean health status. This suggests that 
standardizing for differences in age and sex structure but not for differences 
in health status is unlikely to result in an unbiassed estimate of the extent of 
inequity. 
Le Grand (1978) does, in fact, standardize for differences in both sets of 
variables. However, it would appear that the standardization is done in a 
way that biasses the result towards the detection of inequity favouring the 
rich. It is not clear whether the results were standardized using the direct or 
indirect method of standardization. lo The argument below assumes that the 
direct method was used, but the same conclusions are reached with the 
indirect method. 
Suppose that the aim is to replace group means of health care consump- 
tion and health status with group means that have been standardized for age. 
Suppose too that only two age groups are used - old and young. Again, the 
conclusions would hold if one were to standardize for age and sex together, 
and if one were to use more age groups. The age-standardized mean medical 
care consumption for rich and poor are respectively 
m: = fymry + fomro, mt = f,m,, + fOmpO, (8) 
where f, is the proportion of the population classed as young, f, is the 
proportion of the population classed as old, mr,. is the mean medical care 
consumption in the rich-young group, and so on. 
It is not obvious at first sight quite how reasonable this procedure is. 
Things become clearer when one realizes that this direct standardization 
method can be written in terms of regression equations [cf. van Vliet and 
van de Ven (1985)]. In Appendix A we prove the following result. 
Proposition 5. The direct standardization in eq. (8) is equivalent to obtaining 
standardized values from the following regression equations 
‘m:=Q,+@,x, m,* = Op + @,x, (9) 
where the Q’s and Q’s are estimates of the parameters Q and @, and x is the 
‘She difference between the direct and indirect methods of standardization is most easily 
explained with reference to the standardization of mortality data [cf. e.g. OPCS (1973)]. In both 
cases the standardized figures are computed as weighted averages of age-specific death rates, 
where the weights correspond to either the numbers or proportions of persons falling into each 
of the age groups. The direct method uses the age-specific death rates for the sub-population in 
question but the age distribution of the population at large, while the indirect method uses the 
age-specific death rates for the population at large, but the age distribution of the sub- 
population in question. 
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sample mean of the age dummy xi (i.e. x indicates the proportion of the sample 
who are classed as elderly). 
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix A. 
Thus if one can make sense of eq. (9), one can also make sense of the 
standardization in eq. (8). The former can, in fact, be interpreted as the 
reduced-form equations one obtains by substituting equations for health 
status into the structural equations for medical care consumption. Suppose 
that the true health care consumption model is as in eq. (6) and that the 
health of the two groups is determined according to the model 
h,= tir+pL,xi+e,,, iErich, 
’ {Bp+/lpXt+e,t, iepoor, (10) 
so that an individual’s health depends on his age and income. Substituting 
(10) in (6) gives reduced-form equations for medical care consumption of the 
form 
m.= (a,+Q,e,)+(Br~,+6,)xi+(B,e,i+U,i), 
i 
i E rich, 
’ (a,+P,e,)+(B,~,+6,)xi+(Bpe,i+u,i), iEpoor. 
(11) 
These are identical in form to eq. (9). In other words, eqs. (11) can be written 
mi= 
Q, + ~rXi + ~2, i E rich, 
sZ,+@,Xi+U$ iepoor, (12) 
where al = a, + B,0,, @jr = j&p, + 6,, a,, = aP + &OP, Qr, = &,pP + 6,, u2 = Breri + U,i 
and U~i = /?,e,i + Upi. Calculating standardized means of medical care con- 
sumption via the direct standardization method as in eq. (8) is thus 
equivalent to obtaining standardized means via the reduced-form regression 
equations in (11). 
Bearing this in mind, suppose we define the rich’s standardized share of 
medical care as 
p,= rem: 
r*m:+p.m,*’ 
Computing the latter via the direct standardization procedure (as Le Grand 
does) is equivalent to obtaining it via the regression model in eq. (12). Thus 
rC(a, + he,) + (PA + WI 
%(a, + B,e,) + (PA +&)x1 + Ha, + B,e,) + (B,P(, + &)x1’ 
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The rich’s standardized share of ill-health is 
p= t*h: 44 + PP) 
r.h:+p.h:=r(B,+~,x)+p(e,+p,x). 
Suppose that we are prepared to assume that t?<8, (i.e. the rich have a 
higher autonomous level of health than the poor) and that pI =pcp=p (i.e. 
that differences in income merely cause shifts in the autonomous level of 
health, but do not alter the effect of aging on health, i.e. the p coefficient). 
Then we have the following result. 
Proposition 6. Assume that the true model underlying the delivery of health 
care is as in eq. (6), that the health of the two groups is determined according 
to eq. (lo), that pr=pp=p and that 0, <op. Then it follows char S&> S,*, even 
when the health care system is equitable. 
Proof. Again, the proof is by contradiction. If there is no inequity in the 
delivery of health care, c(~=z,=Q, Br=jIP=/I and 6,=6,=6. If, in addition, 
pI = pP = p, Sz, reduces to 
s:, = b-v, + P,X) + T(T + 6.~) 
scr(e, + 144 + dep + ~~43 + (r + p)(r + 6x1’ 
Suppose now that Sz,<S& Then we have 
but + PA + da + 6x1 et + P,X) 
me,+d+de,+ ~p~)i+(r+~)(~+6x)<r(e,+~,x)f~ep+~px) 
which contradicts the assumption that the rich have a higher autonomous 
level of health than the poor. 
We conclude that Le Grand’s age-sex standardized expenditure shares will 
suggest he existence of inequity favouring the rich even when none exists. 
2.3. Other approaches to the analysis of inequity 
To what extent do the other approaches suggested to date represent an 
improvement over Le Grand’s approach? 
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Cumulative prop of pop ranked by income 
Fig. 2. Illness and expenditure concentration curves. 
2.3.1. The concentration curve approach 
Elsewhere [Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Paci (1989)] we have suggested a
way of extending Le Grand’s approach to allow the extent of inequity to be 
quantified in a way that overcomes the limitations of Le Grand’s range 
measures. There we rank individuals not according to their SEG but 
according to their income, beginning with the poorest. We then construct an 
illness concentration curve (the curve labelled g,,, in fig. 2): this plots the 
cumulative proportions of the population (ranked by income) against the 
proportions of persons reporting illness. If illness is concentrated amongst 
the lower income groups, the illness concentration curve will lie above the 
diagonal, as in fig. 2. This illness concentration curve is then compared to an 
expenditure concentration curve. This is the curve labelled gexp in fig. 2, 
which plots the cumulative proportions of the population against the 
proportions of total expenditure received. Insofar as the lower income groups 
are more intensive users of health services than the higher income groups, 
the expenditure concentration curve also lies above the diagonal. If health 
care expenditures are allocated across income groups in proportion to their 
share of total ill-health, the two concentration curves coincide. If those in 
lower income groups receive less medical care when ill than those in higher 
income groups, the expenditure concentration curve will lie below the illness 
concentration curve. 
The extent of inequity can be assessed by looking at the size of the area 
between the two concentration curves. We suggested measuring the extent of 
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inequity as twice this area. ” If Ci,, is the concentration coefficient for illness 
and C,,, is the concentration index for expenditures, twice the area between 
the two concentration curves is equal to’* 
where HILG is a Le Grand-type index of horizontal inequity. The index is 
positive if there is inequity favouring the rich and negative if there is inequity 
favouring the poor. 
The concentration curve approach manages to overcome one of the 
shortcomings of Le Grand’s work - the emphasis on range measures of 
inequality - but it does nothing to tackle the other deficiencies. 
2.3.2. The Collins-Klein approach 
Collins and Klein (1980) suggest an alternative to Le Grand’s approach, 
which overcomes what they perceive to be the central weakness of his 
approach, namely that it runs the risk of committing the ecological fallacy. 
They divide their sample into several need categories, such as the non-sick, 
the acutely sick and the chronically sick. They then compare the resources 
received by each of the SEGs within each need category. This approach is 
rather more reliable than Le Grand’s if, as seems to be the case, the non-sick 
receive medical care, and/or chronic and acute sickness receive different 
amounts of expenditure. 
The Collins-Klein method is not, however, entirely satisfactory. To 
illustrate the problems with the approach, suppose the mode1 underlying the 
allocation of health care is model (4). Then the mean expenditures of the 
chronically ill, the acutely sick and the non-sick in the rich group are, 
respectively, 
and analogously for the poor. Comparing the mean expenditures received by 
rich and poor within each need category gives 
“Cf. Kakwani’s (1977) index of tax progressivity. 
“Note that the concentration indices are negative if the concentration curves lie above the 
diagonal. 
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Chronic Acute Non-sick 
Rich 
Poor 
If there is no inequity so that a,=a,, /Ir=fip and TV= TV, the mean 
expenditures within each need category will be the same for both income 
groups. 
One problem with this approach is that mean expenditures could be the 
same for both income groups within the chronic and acute categories even if 
there is inequity in the provision of health care. Thus, for example, rr +B, = 
ap + 8, does not necessarily imply a, = aP and /I,= /I,. It might simply be the 
case that a,>ap and /3,cBp l3 The first implies that (A) >O in eq. (5), while 
the second implies that (C)<O. 
This points to another closely-related problem with the Collins-Klein 
approach, namely that it does not allow one to quantify income-related 
inequity. Suppose that the results suggest hat a, > ap, j?, > fl, and ~~ >rp. One 
might well want to know whether the degree of inequity is small or large 
relative to the degree of inequity that existed before, or in another country. 
Or one might be confronted with the sort of results discussed above, where, 
for example, (A) ~0 but (C) ~0. One might want to determine whether or not 
on balance there is inequity favouring the rich. The Collins-Klein method 
does not enable one to address such issues. 
2.3.3. The regression approach 
Puffer (1986) has suggested that the assumptions of proportionality and 
similar treatment of the acutely and chronically sick might be relaxed by 
using regression analysis. He estimates an equation relating medical care 
consumption to measures of health status, income, age, sex and interaction 
terms between income and the other variables. Puffer does not rationalize his 
approach in terms of formal models such as those in the previous section. 
Indeed, he does not define inequity in terms of equal treatment for equal 
need, preferring instead to talk of equal access to health care.i4 His 
approach does, however, tit in naturally with the discussion above. 
13The results of Collins and Klein are consistent with this. They find a class gradient in the 
case of the non-sick, but not in the other need categories. However, they measure mi not in 
terms of expenditure but in terms of whether or not individual i had one or more GP contacts 
in the previous 2 weeks. 
14Mooney (1983) argues that analysing access in terms of utilization of health care makes 
little sense if equality of access is interpreted in terms of equality of opportunity. The reason is 
that utilization depends not only on the opportunities available to people but also on their 
perceptions of the benefits to be had from health care. Instead of analysing utilization one 
should be analysing the time and money costs that people incur in using health care facilities [cf. 
Le Grand (1982)]. 
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Let yi be a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if person i is rich and 0 
otherwise. Then model (2) above can be written as 
mi=IrO+112Yi+712hi+713Yi.hi+Ui, (13) 
where the z’s are coefficients. Thus we have 
(Iro+IE1)+(112+n3)hi+U,i, Erich, 
X0 + 7t2hi + Upi, i E poor, 
so that no = a*, ni = a,- ap, n2 = &,, 7r3 =/I, - /3, and ui = upi + yi * uri. If there is 
no income-related inequity, we have 
ar=ap e- 7r1=0, /?*=&$ * x3=0. 
Thus one could estimate the parameters of the two structural equations in (2) 
by using a single equation regression model and then rest for the existence of 
income-related inequity using the estimates of the ns.i5 For example, one 
could test the hypothesis that n1 =0 to test the hypothesis that the rich in 
the non-sick group receive more health care expenditure than their poor 
counterparts. Or one could test the hypothesis that rri =x3=0 to test the 
hypothesis that there is no income-related inequity overall: this is, in effect, 
what Puffer does. 
One can also test the assumptions implicit in Le Grand’s approach. Thus 
one could test the assumption that only the sick receive medical care by 
testing the hypothesis that no+rrl =rro = 0 (i.e. 7ro = 7ri =O). One can also test 
for the existence of inequity in model (4) where chronic and acute sickness 
receive different amounts of health care. In this case the model becomes 
??li=XO + Icl_Vi + 7C2Ci+ ‘TL3yyI’ Ci + Ic4Si + X,yi* Si+ Ut, (14) 
where 7r4= rp and rr5 =r,-rp. If there is no inequity associated with income, 
we have x1=0 (i.e. ar=ap), x3=0 (i.e. fiI=fip) and n,=O (i.e. rr=rp). One 
can also take into account the confounding influences of demographic 
factors. Thus (6) becomes 
mi=nO+KlYi+K2hi+X3Yi’hi+ItqXi+II5Yi’Xi+Ui, (15) 
where n4 = 6, and rr5 - 6,-J,. One can test the hypothesis of no inequity by 
testing the restriction rri =n3 =ns =0 in this more general regression equa- 
“Note that eq. (13) includes the interaction term yi. h,. Note too that the error term of I+ is 
not homoskedastic. 
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tion. In fact, Puffer’s models are of the form of eq. (15), with gender and age 
included as x variables. Both are allowed to interact with income, as is 
health status. 
Instead of estimating a single equation, one could, of course, simply 
estimate separate equations for each income group. Irrespective of the 
approach adopted, one runs into the same dificulties as in the Collins-Klein 
method. One cannot, for example, determine whether, on balance, there is 
any inequity favouring the rich or not. In other words, rri = 7r2 = rr3 = 0 in eq. 
(15) is a sufficient but not necessary condition for there to be no inequity 
overall. Nor does the regression approach enable inequity to be quantified. 
2.3.4. The discrimination literature 
The similarity between the concepts of inequity in the delivery of health 
care and discrimination in the labour market has already been noted. Given 
the similarity, it might be wondered whether the techniques used to measure 
labour market discrimination might be used to measure inequity in the 
delivery of health care. 
The measurement of discrimination typically proceeds by decomposing 
wage differentials between the groups in question into two parts: a part 
representing the difference due to differences in characteristics, and an 
unexplained part which is attributed to discrimination [cf. Sloane (1985, 
p. 121)]. In the context of the delivery of health care eq. (7) represents uch a 
decomposition. The terms labelled (B) and (D) represent differences in health 
care consumption that are attributable to differences in need and demo- 
graphic factors, while the remaining terms reflect income-related inequity. 
Following the logic of the discrimination literature one might measure 
inequity as the sum of these latter terms, i.e. as (A)+(C)+(E). This sum 
might be corirputed by estimating the structural model (6) either as a set of 
equations [cf. eq. (6)] or as a single equation model a la Puffer (1986) [cf. eq. 
um 
One problem with this approach, which also arises in the context of the 
discrimination literature, is the ‘index number problem’ [cf., e.g., Sloane (op. 
cit.)]. The decompositions in eqs. (3), (5) and (7) are arbitrary in the sense 
that they are based implicitly on the rich group’s utilization equation rather 
than the poor group’s equation. Take the case of model (2). Denote by m; 
the mean medical care consumption the poor would have received if they 
had received medical care, not according to their own utilization equation, 
but according to the rich group’s equation. We might call this the poor 
group’s expected mean consumption. Thus m; is is equal to 
m; = a, + B,h,. 
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Then the difference between actual mean medical care consumption of the 
rich and poor can be decomposed as 
my-m,=[m,-m;]+[m,--ml,] 
= a, + B$, - a, - B$, + a, + Ah, - ap + P,h, 
=(ar-ap)+B,(h,-h,)+hp(8r-pp), 
(4 (W (Cl 
which is what we had in eq. (3). Now suppose that instead of using the poor 
group’s expected medical care consumption in the decomposition, we were to 
use the rich group’s expected consumption evaluated with respect to the poor 
group’s utilization equation. The latter is equal to 
m; = ap + &h,. 
The difference between actual mean medical care consumption of the rich 
and poor can now be decomposed as 
m, - mp = [m, - m;] + Cm; - mp] 
This approach thus yields a similar but not identical decomposition. In the 
initial case, where the decomposition was implicitly with reference to the rich 
group’s utilization equation, the difference between the two groups’ slope 
coefficients was weighted by h,. In the second case, where the decomposition 
is implicitly with reference to the poor group’s utilization equation, the 
difference between the two groups’ slope coefficients is weighted by h,. Since 
it is unlikely that h, and h, are the same, the estimated overall degree of 
inequity will differ, depending on which decomposition one uses. 
There is another problem with the above approach, namely that it relies 
on there being two, and only two, naturally defined sub-populations. In the 
context of discrimination this dichotomy is not a major problem, since the 
population divides naturally into sub-populations thought to be treated 
differently. Obvious examples include males and females, and blacks and 
whites. In the present context no such natural divisions arise. The distinction 
between rich and poor throughout the discussion above has been for 
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illustrative purposes only, and even then there is no natural line dividing rich 
and poor. In the present context, therefore, the approach used in the 
measurement of labour market discrimination would not appear to be an 
attractive option. 
3. A new approach to the measurement of inequity 
In the previous section it was argued that Le Grand’s approach provides a 
biassed picture of the degree of inequity in the delivery of health care. The 
shortcomings of the approach include (i) a failure to allow for the possibility 
that the non-sick may be consumers of health care as well as the sick, (ii) a 
failure to allow for the possibility that the chronically and acutely sick may, 
under the current health care delivery system, receive different amounts of 
health care, and (iii) the use of an inappropriate procedure for standardizing 
for demographic factors. By contrast the approaches of Collins and Klein 
(1980) and Puffer (1986) do not suffer from these shortcomings. Neither, 
however, provides a measure of the extent of inequity. This section outlines a 
new approach to the analysis of inequity, which builds on Le Grand’s 
approach but also makes use of the regression approach. 
Assume for the moment that the true model is as in eq. (4). This is not a 
key assumption: indeed, it is possible in principle to base one’s analysis on 
any model of health care utilization. We define new standardized values rn: 
and rn,+ as 
m,? = CL, + j&h + &x, 
(16) 
m,’ = up + &,h + 6,x, 
where h and x are the sample means of hi and xi respectively. Note that these 
standardized values are obtained from the structural model [cf. eq. (6)J and 
not from the reduced-form model [cf. eq. (ll)]. It is this that distinguishes the 
present standardization method from Le Grand’s. 
Armed with these standardized values one can go on to compute 
standardized expenditure shares and then building on the approach of 
Wagstaff et al. (1989). Consider again the model in eq. (6). Now define the 
rich group’s standardized expenditure share as 
s;,= * 
+ r(a, + Ah +&xl 
rem: +m~.m:=p(a,+S,h+b,x)+r(a,+B,h+6,x)’ (17) 
and analogously for the poor. If there is no income-related inequity, 
ap = a, = a, fir = &, = /I and 6, = 6, = 6. In this case Sz, becomes 
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r (tl+/?h+bx) 
Sf=(,+p)&+ph+bx)=&* 
and analogously for the poor. Thus if there is no inequity, each income 
group’s standardized expenditure share is equal to its share in the popula- 
tion. On the other hand, if, on balance, there is inequity favouring the rich, 
the rich group’s standardized expenditure share exceeds its share in the 
population and the poor group’s standardized expenditure share falls short of 
its population share. More precisely, we have the following result. 
Proposition 7. If the standardized medical expenditure share of the rich, Sz,, 
exceeds its population share, r/(r + p), it follows that 
(a, - apI + W, - 8,) +x(4- 6,) > 0. 
The opposite is true of the poor. 
Proof. Suppose that Sz,> r/(r +p). Then 
42, + Ah + 44 r 
p(~,+P,h+6,x)+r(r,+P,h+S,x)‘r+ 
=> (a,-ap)+h(P,-Bp)+x(S,--8p)>0. 
The proof for the poor follows the same lines. 
Contrast this result with that obtained for Le Grand’s standardization 
procedure (Proposition 6). There it was found that with even when no 
inequity exists SE,> S& Note too that the first term on the left-hand side of 
(18) is term (A) in the decomposition in eq. (7). The second and third terms 
are similar to terms (C) and (E) in eq. (7). However,, they weight the 
differences in slope coefficients by the relevant sample means rather than by 
the means of the poor group [cf. the decomposition in eq. (7)]. This implies 
that the degree of inequity affecting a given illness category is weighted by 
the fraction of the population in that category: the entire population is 
affected by any differences in the ~2s; only the sick (a fraction h of the 
population) are affected by a discrepancy in the /3’s; and only the elderly (a 
fraction x of the population) are affected by a discrepancy in the 6’s. This 
would appear to be a natural solution to the ‘index number’ problem which 
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has plagued the discrimination literature. It would seem not unreasonable 
therefore to say that there is inequity favouring the rich if the sum of the 
three terms on the left-hand side of (18) is positive. On this definition, then, 
S,&>S,: implies that there is inequity favouring the rich. 
In contrast to Le Grand’s approach, then, the approach above presents an 
unbiassed picture of the degree of inequity, assuming, of course, that the 
model is specified correctly. Moreover, it can easily be generalized. There is 
no reason why, for example, chronic and acute health indicators should not 
be included separately in the structural model [cf. eq. (6)]. The model could 
also be generalized to allow for more than two income groups, and the 
inclusion of demographic (and non-demographic) factors other than age. 
Moreover, if the structural model is of a similar form to eq. (16), there is no 
reason why the standardized values should not be obtained via the direct 
standardization procedure rather than via regression analysis.16 In the case 
of eq. (16) we have the following result. 
Proposition 8. The direct standardization analogues of eq. (16) are given by 
mr+ = fhymrhy + fsymrsy + fhomrho + Lom,SOY 
(19) 
m,’ = fhymph, + .Lympsy + fhompho + fsOmpsO~ 
where fhY is the proportion of the population classed as both healthy and young, 
f,, is the proportion of the population classed as sick and young, fbO is the 
proportion of the population classed as healthy and old, f,, is the proportion of 
the population classed as sick and old, rnrhy is the mean medical care 
consumption amongst persons who are rich, healthy and young, and so on. 
The proof of Proposition 8 is given in Appendix A. 
The standardized shares approach can easily be extended to more than 
two income groups. Using the resultant standardized expenditure shares for 
the various income groups one can then plot a standardized expenditure 
concentration curve. This is the curve labelled g&, in fig. 3 and plots the 
cumulative proportions of the population - again ranked according to 
income - against their standardized shares of expenditure received. If there is 
inequity favouring the rich, g,:, will lie below the diagonal (the case 
illustrated in fig. 3), whilst the opposite will be true if there is inequity 
favouring the poor. The extent of inequity can be measured by the 
concentration index for the standardized concentration curve, g.&,. Thus an 
alternative index of inequity to HI,, is 
16Whilst all direct standardizations can be written in the form of a regression model, the 
converse is not true. 
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Fig. 3. Standardized expenditure concentration curve. 
HI -C+ wvp- expr 
where C,&, is the concentration index corresponding to g&,. In the case 
illustrated, HZwvp is defined as the ellipse-shaped area between g,& and the 
diagonal, expressed as a proportion of the area under the diagonal. In the 
case where g&, lies abooe the diagonal (i.e. where there is inequity favouring 
the poor), the concentration index is defined as the negative of the ellipse- 
shaped area as a proportion of the area under the diagonal. Thus, Hlwvp is 
negative when there is inequity favouring the poor (the lower bound being 
-l), zero when there is no inequity, and positive when there is inequity 
favouring the rich (the upper bound being + 1). 
4. Some illustrative cross-country comparisons 
In this section we present some empirical illustrations of the approach 
suggested in section 3 using data for Italy and the Netherlands. 
4.1. Results for Italy 
Our data for Italy 
Survey conducted by 
are taken from the 1985 Health Care Consumption 
Centro Europa Richerche (CER) - a private research 
institute.” This survey, in contrast to the health survey undertaken by the 
“See Bariletti et al. (1986) for an overview of the survey. 
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Italian government’s Central Institute of Starisrics (ISTAT),” contains 
information on income, albeit in a rather crude form. The survey’s primary 
drawback is that the sample is not representative of the Italian population. 
In particular it overrepresents the under-60s and underrepresents the over- 
60s. We therefore weighted the sample so as to make it more 
representative. l9 
Our measure of income is pre-tax family income. We were unable to 
convert family income to a per-person or per-equivalent-adult basis, in part 
because we do not have the actual figure for income (individuals are 
allocated to one of five income groups)” and in part because we do not 
have information on the structure of the respondent’s family. Individuals are 
classified as ill if they reported their health as being not ‘good’. Health care 
expenditure was estimated using information on the number of GP visits in 
the last three months, the number of specialist consultations in the same 
period, and the number of spells in hospital in the last year.*’ The latter 
were divided by 4 to convert them to a quarterly basis. GP and specialist 
consultations were then weighted by the relevant cost per consultation in the 
public sector in 198.5, whilst hospital spells were weighted by the cost per 
case in 1985 in non-profit hospitals providing care to the state under 
contract (so-called ospedali cowenzionati). ** The unit costs were calculated 
at Lit 24,851, Lit 50,690, and Lit 4,001,375 respectively.*’ 
Fig. 4 indicates the distribution of illness and health care expenditure in 
Italy across five income groups. The results are similar to those obtained by 
Le Grand (1978) for England and Wales in fig. 1. The bottom income group 
(which comprises 22.4% of the sample) includes as much 37% of the sick, but 
receives only 27.8% of health care expenditure. By contrast the top income 
group (which comprises 20.4% of the sample) includes only 14.7% of the sick, 
but receives as much as 19.9% of health care expenditure. The values of the 
Gill, CcXp aand HILG indices are -0.1665, -0.0510, and 0.1155 respectively 
(cf. fig. 12).24 The fact that HI,, is positive indicates that there is inequity 
‘*See, e.g., ISTAT (1986, 1987). 
“Details of the weighting are to be found in Paci and Wagstaff (1989). The replication of Le 
Grand’s analysis reported in WagstaIf et al. (1989) was based on an unweighted sample. The 
results are therefore different from those reported below. 
201he data set contains two variables on income, one containing 10 categories, the other 
containing 4. In neither case is the sample evenly spread across the categories, so we have 
generated a new S-category variable based approximately on quintiles. The exact distribution of 
the sample across the 5 categories is indicated in fig. 4. 
*‘In the results for Italy presented in Wagstaff et al. (1989) we did not distinguish between GP 
and specialist consultations. 
**There are no published or unpublished data on the expenditure associated with public 
sector hospitals in Italy. Nor were we able to obtain data on the costs of private hospitals. 
23F~ll details of the cost calculations in the present paper are reported in Paci and Wagstaff 
(1989). 
*%e concentration indices were calculated by means of linear approximation [cf. Fuller and 
Lury (1977, p. 68)]. 
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Fig. 5. Illness and expenditure concentration curves, Italy 1985. 
g ill 
-__ 
gev 
favouring the rich. The concentration curves git, and gexp are shown in fig. 5: 
the latter lies everywhere below the former, indicating that the inequity is 
apparently unambiguous. 
Fig. 6 shows the standardized expenditure shares using the method 
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outlined in section 3. We standardized for illness, age and sex, using four age 
categories, namely (i) 18-29, (ii) 3&44, (iii) 45-59 and (iv) 60+. The 
standardized shares were calculated via the direct standardization method 
using the following equation: 
ml = 1 C C frjpm,ljp, k = 1,2,. . ,5, (20) 
I=1 j=l p=l 
where fijp denotes the proportion of the population classified in gender 
group 1, age group j and health category p, and mkljp is mean health care 
consumption of persons in the kth income group who are classified in gender 
group 1, age group j and health category p.*’ From the relative standard- 
ized expenditure shares in fig 6 one can obtain cumulative standardized 
shares which can be used to construct the standardized concentration curve, 
g &. In this case the curve - shown in fig. 7 - actually lies abooe the diagonal 
for the bottom four income groups and below the diagonal thereafter. The 
value of HIwvP is -0.0409 (cf. fig. 12), which indicates that, on balance, any 
inequity favours the poor rather than the rich. This result is consistent with 
Proposition 1, in which it was suggested that Le Grand’s method overstates 
the degree of inequity favouring the rich. 
4.2. Results for the Netherlands 
Our data for the Netherlands are taken from the combined 1981 and 1982 
Health Interview Surveys conducted by the Dutch government’s Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Our measure of income is pre-tax family income. 
To permit comparisons with the Italian results in section 4.1 we left income 
on a per-family basis rather than convert it to a per-equivalent-adult basis. 
As in the analysis for Italy, individuals were classified as ill if they reported 
their health as being not ‘good’. Health care expenditure was estimated using 
information on the number of GP visits in the previous three months, the 
number of specalist visits in the previous three months, and the number of 
days in hospital in the last year. The latter was divided by 4 to convert it to 
a quarterly basis. Each category of expenditure was then weighted by the 
relevant unit cost for the public sector in 1981/82. The unit costs were 
calculated at Dfi 27.00, Dfl75.00, and Dfl45.80, respectively.26 
Fig. 8 indicates the distribution of illness and health care expenditure in 
the Netherlands across five income groups. The results are similar to those in 
figs. 1 and 4. The bottom income group in the Netherlands (which comprises 
21% of the sample) includes as much as 31.2% of the sick, but receives only 
25Due to the relatively small sample size, 4 of the 80 cells were empty. In these cases we used 
the means for all income groups. 
26Details of the cost calculations are to be found in Van Doorslaer and WagstafT (1989). 
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Fig. 9. Illness and expenditure concentration curves, Netherlands 1981-1982. 
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27% of health care expenditure. The values of the Ci,,, Cexp and the HZ,, 
indices are equal to -0.1508, -0.1302, and 0.0476 respectively. The latter 
indicates the existence of inequality favouring the rich. As was the case with 
the Italian sample, the expenditure concentration curve lies everywhere below 
the illness concentration curve (cf. fig. 9). The value of the HILG index for the 
Netherlands is, however, much smaller than that of Italy (cf. fig. 12). The 
reason for this is that although inequalities in health are similar in the two 
countries (the values of Ci,, are very similar), the distribution of health care 
reflects the distribution of health less in Italy than in the Netherlands. 
Fig. 10 shows the standardized expenditure shares for the Netherlands 
after standardization along the lines suggested in section 3. We standardized 
for illness, age and sex, using four age categories, namely (i) 18-34, (ii) 35-44, 
(iii) 45-64 and (iv) 65 +. The standardized shares were calculated via the 
direct standardization method using eq. (20). The standardized concentration 
curve, g,‘x,, is shown in fig. 11: it lies below the diagonal for the two bottom 
income groups and above the diagonal thereafter. The value of Hlwvp is 
-0.0080 (cf. fig. 12), which indicates that, on balance, any inequity favours 
the poor rather than the rich. As before the relative magnitudes of HI,,, 
and HI,, are consistent with Proposition 1. The value of the former is, 
however, very small in absolute value in the Dutch case. Interestingly, it is 
also smaller in absolute value than the value of Hl,,p for Italy, suggesting 
that there is less inequity favouring the poor. 
0.25 
Bottom’ 2nd ’ ’ 3rd 4th ’ Top 
Income classes 
Fig. 10. Standardized expenditure shares, Netherlands 1981-1982. 
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5. Summary and discussion 
Most of the empirical work on equity in the delivery of health care has 
been based on the concept of horizontal equity. Tyically this is interpreted to 
mean that persons in equal need of health care should receive equal amounts 
of health care, irrespective of whether they happen to be rich or poor. The 
aim of empirical work in the area has thus been to establish the extent to 
which violations of the principle of horizontal inequity are related to income. 
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Much of this empirical work has been based on the methodology proposed 
by Le Grand (1978) in which the distribution of health care expenditures 
across socioeconomic groups is compared with the distribution of illness 
across these groups. Le Grand’s work has, however, been criticized on 
several counts. First, in seeking to quantify the extent of inequity le Grand 
relies on simple range measures of inequality. Second, by implicitly assuming 
that the sick and consumers of health care are the same population, Le 
Grand - it is argued - commits the ecological fallacy [Collins and Klein 
(1980)]. We showed above that this biasses the results towards detection of 
inequity favouring the rich. Third, Le Grand’s implicit assumption that the 
chronically and acutely sick are equally ill has been questioned [Puffer 
(1986)] and we have shown that this too produces a bias in le Grand’s 
approach, but that the direction of bias cannot be established a priori. 
Finally, Le Grand’s attempts to take into account the effects of demographic 
factors appear to be less than satisfactory: indeed, it appears that his 
methods will tend to point towards inequity favouring the rich, even when 
none exists. 
Attempts to improve on Le Grands approach have been only partially 
successful. Elsewhere [Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Paci (1989)] we have 
suggested how Le Grand’s approach might be extended to permit the 
quantification of inequity in a way that avoids the shortcomings of Le 
Grand’s range measures. This extension does nothing, however, to remedy 
the other defects of his approach. Collins and Klein (1980) propose analysing 
different need categories separately. This avoids the ecological fallacy and 
allows the acutely and chronically sick to receive different amounts of care. 
The approach does not, however, allow inequity to be quantified. The same 
is true of Puffer’s (1986) regression approach. 
We have suggested an alternative approach to the measurement of 
inequity that builds on the previous approaches. This involves constructing 
expenditure shares which are standardized in such a way as to ensure that 
each income group’s expenditure share will be equal to its population share 
under an equitable health care delivery system. The concentration index 
corresponding to the standardized expenditure shares is used as a measure of 
inequity. Illustrative empirical results for Italy and the Netherlands lend 
support to the idea that Le Grand’s method overstates the degree of inequity 
favouring the rich. In both countries Le Grand’s method points towards 
inequity in favour of the rich, whilst the method based on standardized 
concentration curves suggests the existence of inequity favouring the poor. 
It is only fair to note that whilst the concentration curve approach 
suggested in the paper would appear to overcome the shortcomings of Le 
Grand’s earlier work, it too entails assumptions which may not command 
universal assent. First, since we have attempted to measure global inequity 
(i.e. inequity within several need categories simultaneously), we have had to 
make a judgement about how to weight each group’s inequity. In the Hlwvp 
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index proposed above inequity affecting a given illness category is weighted 
by the fraction of the population in that category. This seems to be a 
reasonable starting point, but it may well be the case that policy-makers 
might wish later to adopt an alternative value judgement. Second, in our 
identification of Hlwvp with C:,, we have implicitly assumed that when g& 
crosses the diagonal (as it does in both our empirical illustrations), any 
inequity favouring the poor can be offset against any inequity favouring the 
rich, and vice versa. It might be argued (though we are not inclined to such a 
view) that whether inequity favours the rich or poor is immaterial: what 
matters is that violations of the principle of equal treatment for equal need 
should not be related to income. If this argument is accepted, horizontal 
inequity might be measured as the absolute value of any deviations of g&, 
from the diagonal. Finally, like standard concentration indices (of which the 
Gini coefficient is a special case), the HIWvP index implicitly entails an 
assumption about the weight to be attached to inequity at different income 
levels.27 This is important in cases such as in section 4 where the g,‘,, curve 
of one country crosses that of another (cf. figs 7 and 11). In such cases one 
cannot appeal to the concept of ‘Lorenz dominance’, and the concentration 
index is acceptable as a tie-breaker only to the extent that the implicit 
weighting scheme used in its construction is acceptable.28 Clearly it may be 
desirable in future work to explore the possibility of making such judgements 
explicit via a social welfare function [cf., e.g., Atkinson (1970)]. 
Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is a special case of the results reported in 
van Vliet and van de Ven (1985). Take the case of the rich group. Suppose 
the rich receive health care according to the equation 
mi = l2, + cDrxi + u$ i E rich, 
where u$ is an error term. First define rn: as the medical care consumption 
individual i would have received if he had received medical care according to 
the rich group’s utilization equation. Thus, rn: is equal to 
Next define rn: as the average medical care consumption that would have 
been recorded for the population at large if all persons in the population had 
received medical care according to the rich group’s utilization equation. Thus 
rn: is equal to 
*‘For an excellent discussion of the value judgements implicit in the Gini coefficient, see 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1950). 
2sWe are grateful to an anonymous referee for his remarks on this point. 
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m:=(l/n) C rn: 
iepop 
iepop 
=a,+~ ,C Xi 
IEPOP 
= sz, + QrX, 
which is the first equation in (9). It remains to show that this is equivalent to 
the first equation in (8). The model contains two parameters, Q, and @,, the 
OLS estimators of 
8, = mryr 
This can be seen 
groups, i.e. 
which are given by 
@I = m,, - m_.. 
intuitively by taking expected values for the two sub- 
E[mi 1 iorich,xi=O] =Q,s~,~, 
E[m, 1 i E rich, xi= l] = Q, + Qr =m,,. 
Substituting these into the equation 
m:=Q,+@,x 
yields 
rn: = m,, + (mro - m,,)x = mry( 1 -x) + m,,x. 
But x (the sample mean of xi) is simply the proportion of the population 
classified as old. Thus x =f, and therefore (1 -x) = f,. Substituting these 
expressions in the above gives 
m: = fymr, + fom,,, 
which is the desired result. Exactly the same argument applies to m,*. 
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5. 
Take the case of the rich group. Suppose the rich receive health care 
according to the equation 
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mi=a,+B,hi+6,xi+u,i, ierich, (A-1) 
which, following the logic of Proposition 3, gives 
mr+ = a,+ b,h + 6,x. (A.2) 
In this model there are, in effect, four parameters, namely the expected values 
for the four sub-groups. These are 
E[mi 1 i E rich, hi = 0, xi = 0] = a, = mrhy, 
E[mi 1 iE rich, hi = 1, xi = 0] = ~1, +fi, = mrsy, 
E[mi 1 iE rich, hi = 0, xi = l] = a, + 6, = ml,,,,, 
E[miIiErich,hi= l,xi= l] =ar+&+6,=m,,,. 
Thus (A.l) is equivalent to the model 
mi = 1 +jiZji + Uri, i E rich, 
i 
where 
Zli= 1 if hi=0 and xi=O, 
(A-3) 
zzi= 1 if hi= 1 and xi=O, 
zsi= 1 if hi=0 and xi= 1, 
zqi= 1 if hi=0 and xi= 1. 
From (A.3) one gets an alternative expression for m:, namely 
m,+ =C 4jrzj (A-4) 
where the zj are the sample means of the Zji. The OLS estimators of the 4jr 
are given by 
(A.3 
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That (A.2) and (A.4) are equivalent can be seen by using eqs. (AS) and (A.4) 
to get 
mr+ = a,zI + (a, + B&Z + (a, + 6,)~~ +(a, + P, + &)z, 
But z, + z2 + z3 + zq = 1, z2 + zq = h and z3 + zq =x. Substituting these expres- 
sions in the equation above gives (A.2). It remains to establish the 
equivalence of (A.4) and the first of the equations in eq. (17). This can be 
done by using eqs. (A.5) and (A.4) to get 
mr+ =m rhyZl + mrsyz2 + mrhoZ3 + mrsoZ4. 
But ZI =_f&, z2 =.&, z3 =fho and Z4=fsw Substituting these expressions in 
the equation above gives 
m: = fhymrhy + fsymrsy + fhomrho + fsomrsor 
which is the first of eq. (19) in the text. Exactly the same argument applies to 
+ 
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